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The paper deals for expository reasons with the case where individual preferences are strong, i.e., no individual is ever indifferent between two alternatives. The extension to the case where individual preferences are weak orderings is immediate and involves no additional conceptual problems. A short argument can be found in Schmeidler and Sonnenschein [1978] .
STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM
Individuals. Let I = {1, 2, .. ., n}, an initial segment of the integers. Elements of I are called the individuals.
Alternatives. Let A be a finite set. Elements of A are called the alternatives, and they are denoted by x, y, z,.... Preference Relations. Let 9 be the set of complete, reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relations on A. Elements of 9 are called (strong) preference orderings and are denoted by P, P', Pi....
Given P E 9 and x E A, we say that P' is a reshuffling of P around x iff (Vz) (zP'x+-*zPx). In words, a reshuffling of a preference ordering around an alternative x is another ordering under which x preserves the same positions relative to all other alternatives.
Let r(P, x) denote the set of all reshufflings of P around x. Given P E 9 and x E A, XP denotes the ordering obtained from P by placing x down to last place. Formally, xP is defined so that ( Given Pe 2 and YcA, the choice of P in Y is the element C(P, Y)--{x E Yj xPz(Vz E Y)}. Preference Profiles. Let g'n stand for the n-fold cartesian product of 9.
Elements of n are denoted by P, P',..., and are called preference profiles.
When this does not lead to confusion, the i-th element of a profile P will be denoted by Pi, that of a profile P' by P'i,.... Given p Cen and P e-, P/P, denotes the profile P where Pi= P and (Vj # i)?1 = Pj. That is, P/P is obtained from P by just changing to P, the preferences of individual i, and keeping those of all other individuals the same. Voting Schemes. A voting scheme is a function f: gn-+A. We denote the range of f by tf, and let #tf be the number of elements it contains.
A voting scheme is dictatorial iff 3iceI such that (VPCegn)f(P)=C(Pi, tf). That is, if the social outcome is always the alternative that one fixed individual considers best among those which ever obtain.
A voting scheme is manipulable iff 3pEgZn p'eq, icEI such that f(P/Pj)Pjf(P). We then say that i can manipulatef at P via P',. Iff is not manipulable, it is strategy-proof.
Pivotal voters. Given a voting schemef, the options of an individual i at profile P are those alternatives that may become the social outcome for different choices in 9 of i's stated preferences, when individuals other than i declare their preferences to be those in P. Formally, the set o(i, P) of individual i's options at profile P is defined by o(i, P) = {x E A/] PR E 9 9f(P/Pi) = x}.
Clearly, o(i, P) is never empty, since (VP)(Vi)f(P) e o(i, P). When o(i, P)
contains more than one element, we say that i is pivotal at P. Thus, an individual is pivotal at a profilef if he has at least one way of changing the social outcome by changing his vote.
THE GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM. Letf be a voting scheme whose range contains more than two alternatives. Thenf is either dictatorial or manipulable.
PROOF. It will suffice to start from any specific voting scheme f, (with #tf>2) which is strategy proof, and show that it must be dictatorial.
(a) Notice that, since f is strategy-proof, (VP E g9 )(Vi E I)f(P) E C(o(i, P), Pi).
That is:for every profile, the outcome must be the best option at that profile for each one of the individuals. (b) No individual can change the outcome off at a profile by changing his preferences to a reshuffling around this outcome. Formally, (VPe E n) (ViceI)[P' er(Pi,f(P)]-+[f(P/P,)=f(P)]. This is because, otherwise, i could manipulate f either at P via P' or at P/P' via Pi. (c) An individual who changes his preferences to a reshuffling around the outcome of a profile cannot change the options of any other individual.
Formally, where P' = P/P, (VP E-9n) (V i, j E I) [PR E r(Pi, f(P))]-[O(j, P)
=o(j, P')]. To prove it, it will suffice to show that o(j, P')co(j, P), since f(P)=f(P') by (b), Pi E r(PR, f(P')) by definition, and all the argument could thus be reversed to show conversely that o(j, P)co(j, P').
Suppose, then, that o(j, P')cio(j, P), and let ye o(j, P'), yE$o(j, P).
Let f(P) =f(P') = x # y. Since x = C(o(j, P), Pj), and y o(j, P), we have that x = C(o(j, P), YPj) = C(o(j, P/YPj)) =f(P/YPj). On the other hand, since y e o(j, P'), it must be that f(P'/YPj)==y. Since P'/YPj=(P/YPj)/PA, either i can manipulate from P'/YPj via Pi, or else i can manipulate from P/YPj via P,, a contradiction to f's strategy-proofness. (d) Under no profile can two individuals be pivotal unless each one of them has only two options, and these options are the samefor both. Suppose otherwise, i.e., 3i, j e I, distinct x, y, z E A and P E ban1 such that f(P) = x; x, y E o(i, P); x, z E o(j, P). Consider the profile P' where (1) for all1kC {i, j}; Pks=P^s; (2) P, =zPj if xPiz, or P = zP, if zPix; and (3) P,=P if xPjy, or Pj=YPj if yPjx. In words: P, is obtained from Pi by placing z last while preserving the ranking of all other alternatives, when xPiz; if, on the contrary, zPix, then P, places z first. Notice that, when zPix, z cannot be an option for i, since f(P) = x and therefore x is the best option for each individual at P. Similar remarks apply to PJ Since P, e r(Pi, x) and P. er(Pj, x), we must have that f(P')=x, o(i, P')=o(i, P) and o(j, P')= o(], P).
Let now P' be defined as follows. If xPiz (and xP,z, by construction), then P'= YP. If zPix (and zP,x), then R'I = z(YPi). That is: when z is the last alternative in P', y is first in P'; when z is first in P', then z is first and y is second in P'; in both cases, the relative positions of all other alternatives among themselves are the same as in Pi. Similarly, define PJ' so that PJ' zP) if xPjy, and P" = Y(zPj) if yPjx. Observe that y =C(o(P', i), P') since y is ranked either first or second in P'", and z cannot be an option for in P' when P, (and thus P'), rank z in first place.
Similarly, z = C(o(P', j), PJ). Therefore, f(P'/P) = y, and f(P'/P) = z.
By construction, PJ E r(y, PJ), and P' E r(z, P,). Thus, f(P'/P')/P7 =y, while f(P'/P)/PX = z, a contradiction, since the arguments of f in both expressions are identical and z = y. Let f(P) = x. Let V be the set of individuals which are pivotal at P. It suffices to show that, for all i, f(P/P) = x, and that V is still the set of individuals which are pivotal at P/P. A simple induction argument would then complete the proof. The first part, that f(P/P) = x, is clear from (a). The second part, that the set of pivotal individuals cannot change, is the result of the following facts: (I) if i and j are pivotal at P, they are also both pivotal at P/P,; (2) if i is pivotal at P and j is not, then j is not pivotal at P/P,; (3) if i is not pivotal at P and j is, then j is pivotal at P/Pi; (4) if neither i nor j is pivotal at P, then neither is pivotal at P/P. We provide proofs of assertions (1) and (3). Proofs of (2) and (4) result from reversing those provided here. Consider assertion (1). Clearly, i is still pivotal at P/PI, by definition, and f(P/P) = x. Since j is pivotal at P, f(P/lPj) = y. If j is no longer pivotal at (P/PI), then f(P/P,)/IPj = x. But then, since xPiy and, (P/P,)/ Pj= (P/IP1)/P,, f is manipulable at (P/IPj) by i via PR. Now take assertion (3).
Since is pivotal at P, f(P/xPj) = y, and f(P/lPx)/P, = y. Since i is not pivotal at P, if j were no longer pivotal at P/PI we would have f(P/P')/xP =x. But this is a contradiction, since (P/P)/PY = (P/PI/RXP1 (g) If no individual is ever pivotal underffor m1ore than two alternatives, then the range off consists of at most two alternatives. Clearly, if no individual is ever pivotal, then f is constant. Suppose thus that one or more individuals are pivotal at some profile Pc Ea. If there are several pivots at P, they all must have the same two-element set of options, by (d). Let these options be x and y, and assume x =f(P).
By (f), we can assume without loss of generality, that these two alternatives are ranked last and second to last by all individuals, in either order. Now suppose there was a third alternative z in the range off, and let P' be a profile such that f(P') = z. Consider the sequence of profiles p(k), k E {1, 2,..., n}, where p(k) =p, if i? k, and p(k).= Pi if i > k. There will exist some hE {1,.. ., n} for which f (p(k))e <X, y>, while f(P(I1)) e <x, y> for all k < h. But then, individual h can manipulate at P(1-l) via P', a contradiction.
Let us nlow put the reasoning together to complete the proof. If f is strategy-proof and its range consists of more than three alternatives, there must be at least one profile where some individual is pivotal for more than two alternatives (by (g)). But then, by (e), this individual is a dictator.
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